prof baguilat's latest cases
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If ever wala kayong email na natanggap, eto po pala yung cases sa susunod na meeting.
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Hi everyone:
Please read up to the case of de Guzman v. Sison (see course outline) on Monday. Someone from my Thursday class should have left a copy of these cases with the DSS office. I am sending this file as back up. Please inform everyone.
Have a good weekend!
Atty. Baguilat
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 86540-41 November 6, 1989
MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, MAKATI AGRO-TRADING, INC., and LA FILIPINA UY GONGCO. CORP., respondents.
Antonio F. Navarrette and Francisco A. Lava, Jr. for petitioner.
J.N. Borrillo, Jr. Law Offices Co-counsel for petitioner.
Alejandro Z. Barin and Balgos & Perez for Makati Agro-Trading, Inc. and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corp.
Ramon T. Garcia and Fiorello E. Azura for respondent Asset Privatization Trust.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
In this petition for review, Mantruste Systems, Inc. (or MSI seeks the annulment of the decision dated September 29, 1988 and the resolution dated January 4, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases of "Makati Agro-Trading, Inc., et al. vs. Judge Job Madayag, et al." (CA-G.R. SP No. 13929) and "Asset Privatization Trust vs. Judge Job Madayag, et al." (CA-G.R. SP No. 14535) which set aside the writ of preliminary injunction that was issued on December 19, 1987 by Judge Madayag in Civil Case No. 18319 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("Mantruste Systems, Inc. vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, Asset Privatization Trust, Makati Agro-Trading, Inc. and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation"). Judge Madayag enjoined the defendants in. that case from doing the acts stated in its temporary restraining order of November 13, 1987, namely:
... from approving the winning bid and awarding the BAYVIEW property, subject matter of this case, in favor of the winning bidders, the herein defendants, Makati Agro-Trading, Inc. and La Filipina Uy-Gongco Corporation;
enjoining the Defendants DBP and APT from taking physical possession of the BAYVIEW property, or ejecting the plaintiff and its concessionaires, representatives and agents, from the leased premises;
from terminating the Contract of Lease (Annex N); and
from disturbing and obstructing the plaintiff, through the defendants' designated security guards, in the pursuit of its business in the leased premises, until further orders from this Court. (p. 18, Rollo.)
The facts are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
... Herein private respondent Mantruste System, Inc. (MSI) entered into an 4 "interim lease agreement" dated August 26, 1986 with Page 139 the Development Bank of the Philippines — owner of the Bayview Plaza Hotel — wherein the former would operate the hotel for "a minimum of three months or until such time that the said properties are sold to MSI or other third parties by DBP."
On December 8, 1986 the President issued Proclamation No. 50 entitled "Launching a Program for the Expeditious Disposition or Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or the (acquired) Assets thereof, and creating a Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust." The Bayview Hotel properties were among the government assets Identified for privatization and were consequently transferred from DBP to APT for disposition.
To effect the disposition of the property, the DBP notified MSI that it was terminating the "interim lease agreement." In a certificate dated September 18, 1987 signed by Ernesto S. Salgado, President and Chairman of the Board of herein private respondent (Annex D; Exh. 2-APT) the latter agreed to the termination with the following terms:
1. Thirty days from today as of the signing of this Certification, I will consider the Lease Contract between MANTRUSTE SYSTEM, INC. and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES terminated.
2. The Bayview Prince Hotel will be made available for inspection at all times by other bidders.
3. The Bayview Prince Hotel will be ready for delivery to any new owners thirty (30) days from signing of this Certification.
On October 7, 1987 the APT sent a letter to MSI through Mr. Salgado granting the latter an extension of thirty days from October 18 "within which to effect the delivery of the Bayview Prince Hotel to APT." The extension was given to "allow (MSI) to wind up (its) affairs and to facilitate a smooth turn-over of the facilities to its new owners without necessarily interrupting the hotel's regular operation." The signature of Mr. Salgado appears on the lower left hand of the letter under the word "CONFORME."
However, fifteen days later, or on October 22, 1987, MSI — through its Executive Vice-President Rolando C. Cipriano — informed APT of the following points:
xxx xxx xxx
MSI is of the opinion . . . since its lease on the hotel properties has been for more than one year now, its lease status has taken the character of a long term one. As such MSI as the lessee has acquired certain rights and privileges under law and equity.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . it is the company's firm contention that it has acquired a priority right to the purchase of Bayview Hotel properties over and above other interested parties . . . (Annex F, petition, SP-14535).
APT's response to this demand was equally firm. It informed MSI that APT has ". . . not found any stipulation tending to support your claim that Mantruste System, Inc., as lessee, has acquired ... priority right to the purchase of Bayview Hotel . . ." The Trust also pointed out that the "Pre-Bidding Conference" for the sale of the hotel has already been conducted such that for APT to favorably consider your (MSI's) request would not be in consonance with law, equity and fair play (Annex G, Idem)
On October 28, Salgado, speaking for MSI, wrote APT informing the latter of the alleged "legal lien" over the hotel to the amount of P10,000,000 (should be P12,000,000). Moreover, he demanded that the Trust consider MSI a "very preferred" bidder. Nevertheless, on November 4, 1987 herein private respondent allegedly prepared to submit its bid to the APT for P95,000,000.00 in cash or P120,000,000 in installment terms.
On the same occasion, however, MSI asked the Trust for clarification on the following points: (1) whether APT had a clean title over the property; (2) whether the Trust knew the hotel had back taxes; (3) who should pay the tax arrears; and (4) whether MSI'S advances made in behalf of DBP would be treated as part of the bid offer.
From there, the versions of the MSI and the Trust differed. According to herein private respondent, because of the questions it posed to the Trust, it was "immediately disqualified from the public bidding." The trust alleged on the other hand that MSI voluntarily desisted from participating in the bidding. The property eventually was awarded to herein petitioners Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation which submitted a bid for P83,000,000 (should be P85,000,000).
On November 13, 1981, herein private respondent filed a complaint with respondent lower court — docketed as Civil Case No. 18319 — praying among others for: (1) the issuance of a restraining order enjoining APT from approving the winning bid and awarding the Bayview property to private petitioners, and from ejecting MSI from the property or from terminating the contract of lease; (2) the award of the Bayview property in favor of MSI as the highest bidder. On December 15, 1937, the lower court, as already said, granted the writ of preliminary injunction. (pp. 247- 250, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals nullified the lower court's writ of preliminary injunction for being violative of Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A dated December 15,1986, which provides:
No court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining order or injunction against the Trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it . . . Nor shall such order or injunction be issued against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him.
The Court of Appeals rejected Judge Madayag's opinion that the above provision of Proclamation No. 50-A is unconstitutional because: (1) it ceased to be operative in view of the 1987 Constitution; (2) it constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law; and (3) it impinges upon the judicial power as defined in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that:
(1) Proclamation No. 50-A continued to be operative after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, by virtue of Section 3, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) providing that:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
(2) Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not deprive MSI of its property existent, and its belief that DBP had declared it to be the preferred buyer of the hotel is "illusory." Its only "property right" was its reimbursable advances allegedly amounting to P12 million (but denied by DBP in its answer to the complaint) which, it may sue to collect in a separate action.
(3) In view of Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by the lower court against the APT may not be justified as a valid exercise of power, i.e., the power to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, for does not have a legally demandable and enforceable right of retention over the hotel. In any case, judicial power is "not unqualified." It may be regulated and defined by the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution) and by law, and the law in this particular case (Sec. 31, Procl. No. 50-A) provides that judicial power may not be exercised in the form of an injunction against the acts of the APT in pursuance of its mandate.
The seven grounds of this petition for certiorari may be compressed into the following propositions:
(1) that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in substituting its own discretion for that of the trial court on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo and to protect Mantruste's contractual right to retain possession of the Bayview Hotel until all its advances are paid; and
(2) that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in holding that Mantruste's property rights are non-existent except its right to the refund of its alleged advances; (b) in not declaring unconstitutional Section 31 of Proclamation 50-A prohibiting the issuance of an injunction against the APT and (c) in finding that Mantruste is to blame for its failure to participate in the bidding for the Bayview Hotel
We find no merit in the petition.
While the well-known and basic purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the property subject of the action to protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting the same during the pendency of the suit (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445, 452; Lasala vs. Fernandez, 5 SCRA 79; Rivera vs. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643), and that generally, the exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court will not be interfered with (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225, 232), the Court of Appeals however correctly found that, under the lease agreement between the DBP and Mantruste, the latter's claim to a "patent contractual right to retain possession of the Bayview Hotel until all its advances are paid" is non-existent. As the right of retention does not exist, neither does the right to the relief (injunction) demanded (Sec. 3, Rule 58, Rules of Court).
Furthermore, there is Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A to be reckoned with which explicitly prohibits courts and administrative agencies from issuing "any restraining order or injunction against the Trust APT in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it, nor against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him." While the petitioner decries the "probable injustice" that it will suffer if it is ousted from the hotel and possession of the property is delivered to the private respondents as the winning bidders/purchasers at the public auction sale, the greater prejudice and injustice to the latter who, after paying P85 million to purchase the hotel have been deprived of its possession by the illegal issuance of the writ of injunction, may not be glossed over. On the other hand, as indicated by the Appellate Court, the petitioner is not without adequate remedy to recover its alleged P12 million advances on behalf of the DBP to make the hotel operational. It may sue either the DBP, or its successor-in-interest, the APT for payment of the claim.
Mantruste's right to reimbursement for those advances (the exact amount of which remains to be determined) may not be denied. However, its claim to a right of retention over the hotel pending such reimbursement, is, as was correctly found by the Court of Appeals, "illusory" and "non-existent." A mere lessee, like Mantruste, is not a builder in good faith, hence, the right of retention given to a possessor in good faith under Article 546 of the Civil Code, pending reimbursement of his advances for necessary repairs and useful improvements on another's property is not available to a lessee whose possession is not that of an owner.
A lessee is not entitled to retain possession of the premises leased until he is reimbursed for alleged improvements thereon, for a lessee cannot pretend to act in good faith in making improvements.
A lessee, in order to be entitled to one half the value of the improvements introduced by him in the leased premises, or to remove them should lessor refuse to reimburse the half value thereof, must show that the same were introduced in good faith; are useful; suitable to the use for which the lease is intended without altering the form and substance of the premises. (Imperial Insurance, Inc. vs. Simon, 14 SCRA 855.)
Petitioner's contention that he is a builder in good faith for which reason he may not he evicted unless he is indemnified for the cost of his improvements on the leased premises, has no merit. Knowing that his right to occupy the premises was temporary, he is deemed to have built his house at his own risk. (Lopez, Inc. vs. Phil. & Eastern Trading Co., Inc., 98 Phil. 348.)
It is a settled rule that lessees are not possessors in good faith, because they know that their occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the lease, hence they cannot, as a matter of right, recover the value of their improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are reimbursed therefor. (Bacaling vs. Laguna, et al., 54 SCRA 243.)
Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of courts "to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government" (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the legislature, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
The President, in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution, issued Proclamation No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from issuing restraining orders and writs of injunction against the APT and the purchasers of any assets sold by it, to prevent courts from interfering in the discharge, by this instrumentality of the executive branch of the Government, of its task of carrying out "the expeditious disposition and privatization of certain government corporations and/or the assets thereof' (Proc. No. 50), absent any grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation, not being inconsistent with the Constitution and not having been repealed or revoked by Congress, has remained operative (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution).
While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under the system of separation of powers set up in the Constitution, the power of the courts over the other branches and instrumentalities of the Government is limited only to the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion (by them) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in the exercise of their authority and in the performance of Page 145 their assigned tasks (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.
There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency, except when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that paragraph 2 of the Contract of Lease which provides:
2. The term of the lease is a minimum of three (3) months or until such time that said properties are sold to MSI or other third parties by DBP (p. 1, Annex N of Annex A hereof; Exh. I.)
does not give Mantruste preferred standing or "a right of first refusal" as a prospective buyer of the Bayview Hotel. That provision of the lease contract gives it only the right, equally with others, to bid for the property.
In any event, assuming that Mantruste did have that preferred status (for it was assured by Estela Ladrido, DBP's officer-in-charge of the Bayview Hotel, that "all things equal (sic) DBP would be more inclined to sell the Bayview property to MSI Mantruste lost that preferential right by failing to participate in the bidding for the property. Its allegation that it would have submitted a higher bid than the winning bidders, is futile, for the fact is that it did not submit a bid. Its excuses for failing to do so are unconvincing. The real reason is difficult to fathom but the following statement in its petition —
Considering that Mantruste has made capital expenditures of more than P12 million, then this would mean an uninterrupted, peaceful and continued possession by Mantruste of Bayview for more than twenty (20) years in order to complete the offsetting process. (p. 44, Petition.)
may provide a clue. Mantruste may have banked on its alleged advance of P12 million to keep it in possession of the hotel for 20 years, without having to buy it at the APT's auction.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-93-783 July 29, 1996
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE FILOMENO PASCUAL, respondent.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
Intimating as to what the ideals of a good judge should be, Sir Francis Bacon wants judges "to remember that their jus dicere and not jus dare, to interpret law, and not to make law or give law." They ought to be "more revered than plausible, and more advised than confident. Above all things, INTEGRITY is their portion and proper virtue. 1
The Constitution and the statutes, however, limit the legal qualifications of judges to only three bare essentials citizenship, age and experience. The virtues of probity, honesty, temperance, impartiality and integrity, most often used to measure an aspirant to the bench, lose their meaning in individual perception.
While people perceive judges to be above the ordinary run of men, they know that a perfect judge, like a perfect priest, exists only in fantasy.
Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the integrity of respondent judge in this administrative case stands challenged for committing acts of extortion or bribery.
The following antecedent facts appear on record:
Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that irregularities and corruption were being committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan.
On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in order that an investigation on the alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted. Ordered 2 to conduct a "discreet investigation" by the then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo, HA Teofilo Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI Jose Icasiano. They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. Tigas, the NBI team realized was a fictitious character. In view of their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence of Candido Cruz, an accused in respondent's sala.
In his affidavit 3 executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward Villarta, Cruz declared that he was the accused in Criminal Case No. 2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge, after conducting the preliminary investigation of the case, decided that the crime he committed was only physical injuries and so, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction over the case. Cruz believed that he was made to understand by the respondent that, in view of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to respondent the sum of P2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be a drunkard and, in all probability, would need money to serve his vice.
In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused respondent judge to be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was thought to have been caught en flagrante delicto. NBI agents Villarta and Olazo filed the following report:
On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ met with judge PASCUAL at the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where Subject is attending the graduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL that he already had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge PASCUAL) is asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL did not receive the money because according to him there were plenty of people around. He then instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him (Judge PASCUAL) at his office the following day.
At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March 1993), CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to the office of Judge PASCUAL at the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat handed to him four (4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope previously marked and glazed with fluorescent powder.
In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court room and after about 15 minutes, CANDIDO CRUZ came out of the room and signaled to the Undersigned that Judge PASCUAL had already received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately entered the room and informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject denied having received anything from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a thorough search, the marked money was found inserted between the page of a blue book on top of his table.
Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he was subjected to ultra violet light examination. After finding Subject's right hand for the presence of fluorescent powder, he was booked, photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with our Standard Operating Procedure (S.O.P.)
On even date, the results of our investigation together with the person of Judge FILOMENO PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as defined and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. (Rollo, pp. 47-48.)
On May 11, 1994, by resolution of the Third Division of this Court, this case was referred to Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon for investigation, report and recommendation. 4
In connection with this investigation, respondent filed a Memorandum, dated July 28, 1995, wherein respondent presented his version of the case:
Sometime in February 1993, one Ceferino Tigas, a fictitious person according to the NBI, wrote a letter to Court Administrator Ernani Paño of the Supreme Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez endorsed the letter to the NBI Director requesting "discreet" investigation of the Tigas letter. An NBI tandem to Agents Edward Villarta and Reynaldo Olazo proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, to investigate. Said tandem's assignment was merely to conduct discreet investigation supposedly, but it led to incriminatory machinations, planting evidence, unlawful arrest, illegal search and seizure. They contacted Candido Cruz who was mentioned in the letter. They, however, discovered that Ceferino Tigas, the alleged letter writer, was an inexistent person, fictitious as shown by the synopsis report of the NBI agents (Exhibit 8). Having contacted Candido Cruz, the NBI agents persuaded him to participate in what they called "entrapment operation." The NBI agents prepared an affidavit, then a supplementary affidavit and had them signed by Candido Cruz. They also went to the NBI Headquarters and had four (4) P500 bills dusted with fluorescent powder which they used in the "operation" against the accused.
In the afternoon of March 25, 1993, the NBI, along with Candido Cruz, proceeded to the municipal building of Angat, Bulacan, where the accused judge was holding office. However, they learned that the accused judge was not in his office but was then attending the graduation rites of his son at the nearby Colegio de Sta. Monica, and so they decided to move their "operation" to the school grounds. The ceremonies had not yet begun. Candido Cruz saw the accused in one corner of the compound and approached him. He tried to give the accused an envelope allegedly containing money, but the judge refused to accept it and angrily drove Candido Cruz away. Rebuffed, the NBI agents decided to reset their "operation" the following day.
At around 9:30 in the morning of March 26, 1993, the NBI agents and Candido Cruz arrived at the municipal building of Angat, Bulacan. Cruz, as planned, entered the accused judge's chambers and placed an envelope, allegedly containing marked money, right on his (judge's) desk. He thought it was a pleading for filing and he told Candido Cruz to file it with the office of the clerk of court at the adjacent room. Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing the reply, the accused suddenly erupted in anger, he grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it to Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor, the accused picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of Cruz's polo shirt and drove him out of the chamber.
Just second thereafter, agents Villarta and Olazo entered the door of the chamber which door was open at that time. They introduced themselves and told the accused that the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Accused told them that he did not receive or accept money from Cruz. But they proceeded to search the room, the table, its drawers, and every nook and cranny of his room, including the pockets of the accused's pants. After scouring the place, the agents failed to find the envelope with the marked money. And so, one of the agents called for Candido Cruz who was waiting outside at a waiting shed fronting the municipal building, and asked him were the envelope was, Cruz came back to the room and, together with agent Olazo, approached the cabinet and said "heto pala"
Then, the accused's humiliating experience began. Thereafter, despite the strident protestations of the accused, the envelope, which came from the table of the judge, pictures were taken, and the accused was arrested by the NBI agents. 5
On August 11, 1995, Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon submitted the following report and recommendation:
The Investigating Judge respectfully submits her findings based on the evidence at hand.
As against the respondent judge's denials, the undersigned submits that the sworn affidavits of complainants and NBI Agents and documentary proofs attached to the records are more convincing and nearer to the truth. They have no motive for fabricating this charge, except to bring justice. Credence should be given to the testimony of the NBI Agents coming as it does from an unpolluted source. These Agents had no reason to testify falsely against the respondent judge. They were just doing their duty. On the other hand, the respondent judge had to protect himself against the testimonial and technical/scientific evidence that he had received the envelope and to reject its implications of such evidence.
Furthermore, his defense that he was just instigated to commit a crime is likewise untenable. The principle evolved from the cases appears to be that in a prosecution for an offense against the public welfare, such as accepting bribe, the defense of entrapment cannot be successfully interposed; . . .
One may well wonder over the manner the envelope containing the money was proffered to the respondent judge as he narrated his story on how he got mad at Candido Cruz when he proffered the said envelope, how he threw, picked it up and placed in the pocket of the latter and how he drove him away. He even testified that it was just "planted" by the NBI Agents when the latter allegedly placed the envelope inside a directory which was placed on top of a cabinet.
. . . Why was he not surprised that somebody barged into his chamber or was he really accustomed with people directly dealing or negotiating at his chamber, as what Cruz did, instead of dealing with his staff. His "angry words" and his actuations, according to his testimony, were not convincing at all to show that he was that fuming mad at Candido Cruz's offer. More so, his claim that NBI Agents connived with Candido Cruz just for their own personal glory was not even persuasive. His excuse of the presence of fluorescent powder on his hand was flimsy and incredible.
The act of the respondent shows that he can be influenced by monetary considerations. This act of the respondent of demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant before his court constitutes serious misconduct in office. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct, no matter how nominal the amount involved on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law that will surely erode the people's respect for law and lose faith and trust in the courts which are expected to render fair and equal justice to all.
Such act go against Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which state: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities and a judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.
xxx xxx xxx
With the above, the Investigating Judge respectfully recommends that appropriate penalty be imposed upon the respondent.
We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction.
We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of the respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him and present in his defense.
This lapse in due process in unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct of any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. 6 The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character. 7 The above-quoted Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen short of the requirements of due process.
The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material points.
It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who must have had an ax to grind against the respondent judge but who, by reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to put up a righteous case, did not come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter. The letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify crimes committed or illegal acts perpetrated but charged respondent with anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge could not have been expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise defend himself from vague accusations.
While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the Tigas letter, ordered the NBI investigating team to make a "discreet investigation" of respondent, the NBI team had instead caused an instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not having found letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person exists, they sought out an accused before respondent's court who could possibly be respondent judge's virtual victim. Approached by the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been brought before the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation on the charge of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge gave judgment to the effect that the crime committed by Candido Cruz was that of physical injuries merely. He declared then that he had original jurisdiction to try the case.
But, respondent's action in this regard was perpetrated some time before Candido Cruz was "persuaded to participate in what they (the NBI agents) called 'entrapment operation'." The opportune time to bribe the respondent should have been before the acted in reducing Cruz' criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries. No bribe was asked then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask for it on the date of the entrapment on March 26, 1993, the favorable verdict having been rendered already.
It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted 8 that, despite the fact that he "scoured" the table of the respondent in search of the envelope, with marked money in it, no envelope was found and so he had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz can locate the envelope.
In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the allegations of respondent judge in his defense that, at around 9:30 o'clock in the morning of March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz, along with the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan. Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent judge's chambers, located thereat, and placed before respondent judge an envelope containing marked money. Respondent judge thought that what was placed before him was pleading for filing and so, he told Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent judge suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it at Candido Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of Cruz' polo shirt and drove him out of his chambers, introduced themselves, and told respondent judge that the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told them that he did not receive or accept money from Candido Cruz. After respondent judge said this, the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to search the room, examined tables, drawers, and every nook and cranny of respondent' chambers of respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find the envelope containing marked money allegedly given by Candido Cruz to respondent judge.
Candido Cruz, who had gone down to the waiting shed, was called for by one of the agents. Candido Cruz was asked as to the whereabouts of the envelope containing money. Candido Cruz went back to the judge's chambers and made the motions of conducting a search. Eventually, he went straight to the top of a cabinet and, in the manner of a magician, produced the envelope with marked money, saying, "heto pala".
Thereafter, photographs were taken of respondent judge who was humiliated no end by the fact that the envelope with marked money was placed on top of his desk with respondent judge in front of it.
In his testimony before the Sandiganbayan, NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo stated that the marked money used in their entrapment operation actually came from Candido Cruz and not from the NBI, 9 and he was not able to see what actually transpired between Candido Cruz and respondent judge inside the chambers of the judge. He was outside the judge's chambers and entered it only after Candido Cruz gave the signal that the money was already delivered by him to the respondent. 10 Candido Cruz, on the other hand, testified that the marked money used in the alleged entrapment operation was given to him by the NBI 11 and, when he went out of the judge's chambers after giving the money, he signaled to one, Col. Javier, who was then positioned immediately outside the chambers. 12
In view of the foregoing facts, it is easy to conclude that the acts of the NBI agents which triggered the incident that transpired inside respondent judge's chambers constituted instigation and not entrapment as claimed by the prosecution. It is evident that Candido Cruz was induced to act as he did in order to place respondent judge in a compromising situation, a situation which was not brought about by any request of respondent judge. It is surprisingly strange that an accused in a case would simply barge into the judge's chambers without rhyme or reason, place bribe money on top of the judge's desk without so much as explaining what the money was for. Respondent judge's action on Candido Cruz's case which case which favored Cruz was effected long before. We can believe the fact that, under the circumstances, respondent judge did react in anger and threw the envelope at the accused Candido Cruz. The judge must have given back the money to Candido Cruz and literally drove Cruz out of his chambers bringing the money with him. This explains the reason why the NBI Agents notwithstanding a relentless search did not find the money inside the chambers. Four (4) NBI Agents made the search and they were unable to find the envelope with the marked money in it. This fact NBI Agent Olazo in effect admitted because he had to call back Candido Cruz in order to make Cruz divulge as to where the bribe money was placed. When, after all, Candido Cruz produced the money when he went back to judge's chambers, it became obvious that the money when offered to respondent judge was not received by the latter.
The foregoing set of facts smacks of unlawful prosecution and planting of evidence amounting to persecution. It is reprehensible to say the least that NBI agents should entrap the respondent judge by illegal means, besmirch his reputation by the planting of evidence against him and make the public the foregoing charges of bribery against him in the face of the unjustified and illegal incriminatory machinations perpetrated by the NBI agents in connivance with Candido Cruz.
We, thus, hold respondent Judge Filomeno Pascual blameless of the charge of bribery against him.
It should be noted that Candido Cruz insisted that he had participated in the alleged entrapment operation only because of the fact that the NBI agents made him believe that there was an order therefor from the Supreme Court. 13 Considering that he is illiterate and is already more than 70 years of age, it is understandable why he was easily persuaded by the NBI agents to cooperate without need of any threat whatsoever. Inconsistencies in his testimony is likewise attributed to his aforesaid personal circumstances for it does not jibe with practical experience that a person telling the truth will still have to struggle to remember everything that transpired, he having been a participant in the operation. Gross mistake on very important points not easily forgotten are very strong indicia of the falsity of the story given by a witness. 14
We reiterate the ruling in the case of Raquiza v. Castaneda, Jr., 15 that:
The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.
Reasonable doubt is the inability to let the judicial mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt after a thorough investigation of the whole evidence. 16 The principle of reasonable doubt being applicable in the instant case, therefore, we find that the alleged act of bribery committed by respondent has not been sufficiently and convincingly proven to warrant the imposition of any penalty against respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent judge is hereby exonerated and the administrative case against him is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ. concur.
Footnotes
1 Francis Bacon, "Of Judicature," Handbook for Judges, Glenn R. Winters, Ed, p. 276.
2 Rollo, p. 52.
3 Rollo, pp. 11-12.
4 Rollo, p. 286.
5 Exh. 6-A, pp. 2-4.
6 Raquiza vs. Castañeda, Jr. 81 SCRA 235, 244 [1978].
7 TSN, June 9, 1994, p. 23.
8 TSN, May 3, 1994, p. 17.
10 TSN, June 9, 1994, p. 14.
11 TSN, Jan. 30, 1995, p. 14.
12 Ibid., p. 33.
13 TSN, January 30, 1995, p. 28.
14 People vs. Hernandez, 91 Phil. 334 [1952].
15 81 SCRA 244 [1978].
16 U.S. v. Lazada, 18 Phil. 90, 96 [1910].
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1282 March 1, 2001
(formerly OCA IPI No. 98-628-MTJ)
SOFRONIO DAYOT, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RODOLFO B. GARCIA, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, CALAVATRA — TOBOSO, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Complainant Sofronio Dayot was accused of the crime of Grave Slander which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 5072-T. He was convicted by respondent Judge Rodolfo Garcia of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calavatra, Negros Occidental and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months of arresto mayor and to pay the offended party the amount of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as exemplary damages and costs of suit. The Regional Trial Court affirmed the conviction but increased the penalty to three (3) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum. The award of moral damages was likewise increased to P10,000.00. Complainant filed a petition for review, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Motion for Reconsideration therefrom was likewise denied. The case was elevated to this Court by way of petition for review on certiorari which was docketed as G.R. No. 132446. The Court's Second Division, in its Resolution dated March 11, 1998, denied due course to the petition. Herein complainant filed on April 17, 1998 a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Resolution. While this motion was pending, respondent judge issued a warrant for the arrest of herein complainant and ordered his detention in the Order dated May 4, 1998. On July 6, 1998, this Court resolved to deny the motion with finality.
In the present case, Complainant alleges that respondent judge committed misconduct of office, abuse of authority and oppression when he issued the warrant of arrest and ordered complainant's detention despite the pendency of a motion for reconsideration as this Court had yet to resolve the petition with finality; that he filed a motion to lift the arrest warrant but up to this time the same remained unacted upon; that respondent Judge further issued an Order discrediting his service of sentence from May 6, 1998 up to November 6, 1998, the date of the order, after considering that his service of sentence was made outside the prison cell.
In the Resolution dated June 14, 2000, the parties were required to manifest if they are submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted. Both parties submitted their respective "Manifestation with Additional Records."
The Court Administrator, in his Memorandum, recommended that respondent Judge be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 upon finding that respondent Judge issued the Order dated November 6, 1998 (which declared that the service of sentence from May 6, 1998 to November 6, 1998 be not credited as service by herein complainant) without a hearing or notice to the accused and/or his counsel.
We find the recommendation of the Court Administrator to be well-taken.
Complainant charges respondent Judge with misconduct of office, abuse of authority and oppression when he issued the warrant of arrest and ordered complainant's detention despite the pendency of the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 132446 before this Court. It should be noted that complainant filed a Manifestation in G.R. No. 132446 reiterating the fact that a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent judge despite the pendency of the motion for reconsideration but the said Manifestation was merely noted without action in view of the fact that the petition for review on certiorari had already been denied for lack of merit and the motion for reconsideration was likewise denied with finality per SC Resolution dated October 12, 1998 (Annex "A"). As to whether there was error on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the issuance of the warrant of arrest, complainant addressed this matter in the Motion to Lift the said warrant of arrest which he filed with the respondent Judge, wherein complainant argued that the petition before this Court is still pending. This motion was however denied by respondent Judge in his Order dated June 25, 1998. Whether the respondent Judge correctly denied the motion is a judicial matter which is not a proper subject in an administrative proceeding. Consequently, complainant's charge that respondent Judge failed to act on the Motion to Lift the arrest warrant is untenable as he had issued an Order on June 25, 1998 denying the said motion.
With regard to the allegation that complainant was denied his right to be heard, it appears that the subject Order dated November 6, 1998 was issued upon "oral complaint of the mother of the offended party that accused-convict Sofronio Dayot is serving his one (1) year term of imprisonment . . . . not inside the prison cell." It appears that thereafter respondent Judge issued an order which decreed that such service of sentence be not credited as service by herein complainant. It is not disputed that the said order was issued without a hearing or notice to the accused or his counsel. As correctly pointed out by the Court Administrator, respondent Judge may have been prompted by his desire to get rid of corruption and special treatment extended to some prisoners, but that is not a license for him to abuse his judicial discretion by depriving the accused of his right to be heard. If indeed complainant was getting special treatment, being provided with special sleeping quarters in the third floor of the municipal building instead of serving sentence inside the jail, this matter is essentially the responsibility of the Jail Warden and the sanction imposed upon the accused should be given only upon due hearing. While a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives (De Vera vs. Dames II, 310 SCRA 213). The issuance of the Order of November 6, 1998 without the benefit of a hearing is a clear evidence of the judge's failure to understand the limitations of his power and betrays his ignorance of the cardinal principles of due process (Macasasa vs. Imbing, 312 SCRA 385). By unilaterally discrediting the period served outside the jail without giving complainant a chance to be heard, respondent Judge failed to observe the requirements of due process.
WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Court Administrator, respondent Judge is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely by this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1629 March 26, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. 99-731-RTJ)
HILARIO DE GUZMAN, JR., complainant,
vs.
JUDGE DEODORO J. SISON, Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Dagupan City, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
In a letter dated December 16, 1998 a copy of which was received by the Office of the Chief Justice on December 23, 1998,1 complainant Hilario De Guzman, Jr., the winning mayoralty candidate for San Jacinto, Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections, called the Court's attention to alleged irregularities in the adjudication of the election protest filed by his rival, which was docketed as Elec. Case No. 31-982 and assigned to Branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, presided by respondent judge.
The letter was subsequently indorsed3 by the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), which, on January 25, 1999,4 required respondent judge to comment within ten (10) days from receipt.
On March 4, 1999, respondent judge filed his comment5 averring that:
A.] The unverified letter states no cause of action.
B.] The questioned judgment is supported by evidence; hence valid and lawful.
C.] The letter writer has availed of the legal remedy of appeal with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); and so, the matter continues to be of judicial concern. In fact, the case folder has already been forwarded to the COMELEC.
D.] The questioned judgment speaks for itself. It is characterized by judicial objectivity dictated only by the highest interest of truth and justice. The Presiding Judge resolved the case according to his conscience and to his perception of the applicable law. The case was decided on the basis of merit, not on extraneous considerations. Since the Presiding Judge was guided by the evidence adduced, then, no other conclusion is apparent but to render the questioned judgment.
E.] The Supreme Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a Judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders.6
On March 16, 1999,7 the Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Office-OCAD, Docket and Clearance Division, advised complainant to file a formal complaint against respondent judge. Accordingly, complainant filed a formal complaint on May 14, 1999,8 attaching thereto the pertinent documents9 in support thereof.
Subsequently, on October 12, 1999,10 complainant wrote a letter to the OCA praying for the early resolution of the case, and submitted therewith a copy of the decision of the COMELEC's 2nd Division dated October 5, 199911 in EAC No. A-20-98, entitled, "Rolando P. Columbres, Protestant-appellee versus Hilario De Guzman, Jr., Protestant-appellant," reversing the ruling of respondent judge in Election Case No. 31-98. This decision of the COMELEC's 2nd Division was subsequently affirmed by the COMELEC sitting en banc.12
In a Resolution dated December 1, 1999, the Court noted the above-mentioned letter of complainant and referred the case to Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from notice.13
On March 8, 2000, respondent judge filed his comment,14 substantially reiterating the arguments he raised in the earlier comment he filed on March 4, 1999.
In accordance with the directive of the Court, Investigating Justice Marina L. Buzon submitted a Report dated May 23, 2000 where she summed up the pertinent factual antecedents of the controversy thus:
Complainant Hilario de Guzman, Jr. was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Jacinto, Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections, garnering 4,248 votes as against 4,104 votes obtained by Rolando E. Columbres.
Columbres filed an election protest against the complainant, docketed as Election Case No. D-13-98, which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Dagupan City, presided over by respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison. On December 7, 1998, a decision was rendered by respondent finding that the revision and physical counting of votes/ballots in forty two (42) precincts contested by Columbres showed that the latter won the mayoralty elections of San Jacinto, Pangasinan, garnering 4,037 votes as against complainant's 3,302 votes.
In a letter dated December 16, 1998 addressed to the Honorable Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., complainant charged the respondent with manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law in the appreciation of the ballots in Election Case No. D-31-98, as shown by the following:
1. Respondent nullified all the votes in his favor in Precinct Nos. 35 and 35A in Barangay Casibong for failure of the Election Chairman to countersign the ballots, citing Batas Pambansa No. 222 and Section 36 of Comelec Resolution No. 1539, as well as the case of Bautista vs. Castro.15 Complainant argued that B.P. 222 and Comelec Resolution No. 1539 and the case of Bautista vs. Castro refer to the barangay elections in 1982 and that the law governing the 1998 elections is the Omnibus Election Code and the Comelec General Instructions for the May 11, 1998 elections.
2. Respondent nullified the ballots with undetached stubs despite the provision in Section 211 (27) of the Omnibus Election that failure to remove the detachable coupon from a ballot does not annul such ballot.
3. Respondent nullified ballots with "X" marks, lines and similar marks despite the provision in Section 211 (21) of the Omnibus Election Code that circles, crosses or lines placed on spaces on which the voter has not voted shall be considered as signs of desistance from voting and shall not invalidate the ballot.
Complainant further alleged that respondent prematurely terminated the presentation of his evidence and declared the case submitted for decision because of the absence of his lawyer at the hearing on December 1, 1998; that the motion for execution of the decision filed by Columbres was set for hearing by respondent despite the fact that he was not furnished with a copy thereof and said motion did not contain a notice of hearing; and that he appealed the decision to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent stated that his decision is supported by the evidence and his perception of the applicable law. He claimed that the invalidated ballots were accomplished by more than one person or were prepared by persons other than the registered voters as shown by the identical handwriting strokes or were prepared in longhand and in print and in the same sequence of candidates, or contained distinctive marks or irrelevant words that could identify them or were not signed at the back by the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors and had no Comelec watermark or red and blue fibers in the ballots; that signatures and thumbmarks in the voter's registry record (CE Form No. 1) are different from those in the computerized list of voters (CE From No. 2); that complainant was given adequate opportunity to refute or dispute the overwhelming documentary evidence against him but he failed to do so; that complainant appealed the decision to the COMELEC; and that a judge may not be held administratively liable for every erroneous order or decision rendered by him.
xxx xxx xxx
A verified complaint with annexes, dated May 7, 1999, was filed by complainant on May 10, 1999 charging respondent with gross ignorance of the law and irregularities in connection with Election Case No. D-31-98, to wit:
1. The decision nullifying 946 votes in his favor is contrary to the facts and the law for the following reasons:
a) 416 ballots with "X" marks or horizontal or vertical lines placed over empty spaces after the name of the last candidate written by the voter are not marked ballots, as such markings merely indicate desistance of the voter from voting and do not invalidate the ballots (Section 211 [21] of the Omnibus Election Code);
b.) 267 ballots with undetached coupons are valid as the failure to remove the detachable coupon from a ballot does not annul such ballot (Section 211 [27], Omnibus Election Code);
c.) 181 ballots which were not signed by the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors were invalidated on the basis of Section 14 of B.P. 322 (sic), Section 36 of Comelec Resolution No. 1539 and the case of Bautista vs. Castro, despite the fact that the 1998 national and local elections were governed by the Omnibus Election Code and Comelec Resolution No. 2962 and the applicable case is Punzalan vs. Comelec;
d.) 82 ballots were allegedly filled out by more than one person or that only one person filled out several ballots on the basis of the voters' registration record and voting record but he was not allowed to present an expert to validate/corroborate said findings;
2. Respondent exhibited manifest partiality in the conduct of the proceedings in violation of his right to due process, as shown by the following:
a) Respondent declared the case submitted for decision although he was not yet through with the presentation of his evidence;
b) Respondent did not act on his motion for partial determination;
c) Respondent scared his witnesses and angrily stopped his counsel from asking questions to his witnesses;
d) Respondent denied his motion to post a supersedeas bond;
e) Respondent admitted the memorandum of Rolando Columbres although it was filed beyond the period;
f) Respondent accepted payment of the bond for the revision of contested ballots made beyond the period within which to do so;
g) His counsel was served with a copy of the Order dated November 26, 1998 only on December 1, 1998 barely three (3) hours before the scheduled hearing;
h) His motion dated November 26, 1998 was never set for hearing;
i) Respondent did not wait for his formal offer of evidence;
j) Respondent was seen with Mr. and Mrs. Rolando Columbres and Noli Caramat at Northern Paradise Resort in San Jacinto, Pangasinan in the afternoon of the day he issued the writ of execution pending appeal, a shown by the picture and affidavit of the photographer, Mrs. Rosario Omictin; and
k) Respondent was in the municipal building of San Jacinto, Pangasinan with Rolando Columbres when the writ of execution pending appeal was implemented by the NBI Agents as shown by the affidavit of Emmanuel Hipolito;
3. Respondent issued the writ of execution pending appeal without good reasons therefor;
xxx xxx xxx
In his Comment on the verified complaint dated May 7, 1999, respondent reiterated the Comment earlier filed by him and claimed that any error in his decision is correctable by appeal and not through an administrative complaint, absent any showing of malice or bad faith on his part. He denied that he met with Columbres on December 18, 1998 at the Northern Paradise and that he was at the municipal building of San Jacinto, Pangasinan on December 21, 1998.
Replying thereto, complainant argued that respondent did not merely commit an error in judgment considering that the latters' appreciation of the contested ballots was based on non-existent rules and that he will present pictures showing that respondent was at the Northern Paradise Resort on December 18, 1998.
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Investigating Justice found respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and manifest partiality and recommended that he be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges with prejudice to reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality, reasoning thus:
In the case at bench, it would seem that respondent deliberately applied B.P. 222 and Section 36(f) of Comelec Resolution No. 1539 to justify his nullification of the ballots which did not bear the signature of the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors at the back thereof, in order to favor Rolando Columbres as a number of such ballots were cast in favor of complainant. Respondent then disregarded Section 211 (27) of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that ballots with undetached coupons are valid, in order to nullify 267 such ballots in favor of complainant as against only 52 such ballots in favor of Columbres. On the other hand, respondent took note of Section 211(23) of the Omnibus Election Code in nullifying ballots allegedly filled out by two (2) persons before it was deposited in the ballot box during the voting. In other words, respondent considered only Section 211(23) of the Omnibus Election Code because it supported his nullification of the ballots in favor of complainant, and when he could not find other provisions in said Code that would support the nullification of the ballots in favor of complainant, respondent applied B.P. 222 and Comelec Resolution No. 1539, although the same referred exclusively to the election of barangay officials. Thus, respondent's refusal to apply the pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Election Code in the appreciation of some ballots which would have resulted in finding the same as valid votes for complainant, rendered his actuation highly dubious. As pointed out in Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership vs. Velasco (277 SCRA 342, 367-368), this is not a case of not knowing or failing to understand legal principles and relevant doctrines but of a deliberate disregard of them. Such deliberate disregard by respondent of the pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and his application of B.P. 222, which is already obsolete, cannot be explained away as an honest mistake of judgment or an innocent error in the exercise of discretion. It can only be viewed as an attempt, through misuse of judicial processes, to give a semblance of merit to a clearly unmeritorious cause and accord undeserved benefits to the party espousing and promoting said cause.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, the picture (Exhibit "C") allegedly taken by complainant's witness, Rosario Omictin, at the Northern Paradise Resort in San Jacinto, Pangasinan on December 18, 1998 only shows respondent with Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Caramat and an unidentified woman. While said witness testified that she saw Columbres leaving the resort upon her arrival thereat, it has not been shown, however, that Columbres was in the company of respondent on said date. However, said witness also testified that she saw respondent together with Columbres waving at the balcony of the municipal building of San Jacinto, Pangasinan in the morning of December 21, 1998 on the occasion of the latter's assumption of office as Mayor. The presence of respondent at the terrace of the municipal building between 9:00 and 9:30 in the morning of December 21, 1998 prior to the service of the writ of execution on complainant, was likewise testified to by Emmanuel Hipolito. As pointed out by complainant in his Memorandum, the trial calendar for December 21, 1998 (Exhibits "9" and "9-a") submitted by respondent showing that he had sixteen (16) cases set for hearing in the morning of said date does not prove that respondent actually conducted said hearings. The trial calendar only lists down the cases scheduled for hearing on a particular date. The best evidence that respondent was actually present in his court and conducted hearings in the morning of December 21, 1998 would have been the minutes of the proceedings and the Orders issued in the cases calendared on that day. Thus, the denial of respondent that he was in the municipal building of San Jacinto, Pangasinan in the morning of December 21, 1998, cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of complainant's witnesses, in the absence of competent evidence to prove that he conducted hearing on said time and date. The presence of respondent in the municipal building of San Jacinto on the day that the writ of execution pending appeal, which was personally signed by him, was implemented, and his act of joining Columbres in waving at the balcony only opened him to suspicion of partiality in favor of Columbres.
In the Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 151, 157) of Senior Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez to the Honorable Chief Justice, it was pointed out that respondent was admonished for ignorance of the law in RTJ-90-532, and that in A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, respondent was found guilty of ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion and was meted a fine of P20,000.00 with a warning that a commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Obviously, respondent did not take heed of said warning, as well as the admonition to Judges in Bayog vs. Natino (271 SCRA 268, 273), to wit:
"We have time and again stated that judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. We have reminded them that under Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, they are required to be studious of the principles of law and to administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law. (Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1, 21 [1994]).
Judges of trial courts, either of limited or general jurisdiction, should never forget that they are in the forefront in the sacred task of administering justice. Any decision or order causing injustice or resulting in oppression or failure of justice would have a negative effects in the Judiciary itself. Judges must not allow this to happen. . . ."
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings of Justice Buzon. The culpability of respondent Judge Sison has been established not just by substantial evidence which suffices in an administrative investigation,16 but by an overwhelming preponderance thereof.
The subject case involved an election protest relative to the Mayoralty Elections of 1998. At that time up to the present, such elections were governed by the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines,17 the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987,18 and the Synchronized Elections Law of 1992.19
Clearly, B.P. Blg. 222 and Section 36 of Comelec Resolution No. 1539 invoked by respondent in the resolution of Election Case No. D-31-98 were inapplicable because they applied to the election of barangay officials in 1982 and they have already been repealed and rendered obsolete. It is, thus, perplexing why respondent judge insisted in applying B.P. Blg. 222 which pertained only to the election of barangay officials in 1982 instead of B.P. Blg. 882, enacted on December 3, 1985, which expressly governs mayoralty elections including those held in 1998.
. . . [I]t is given that a member of the bench must keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments, bearing in mind that his learning process never ceases even as it is so indispensable in the correct dispensation of justice.20 When the law violated is elementary, the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.21
In other words, judges should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence, and regard the study of law as a never-ending and ceaseless process.22 Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, as in this case, it is incumbent upon respondent to apply them regardless of personal belief or predilections. To put it differently, when the law is unambiguous and unequivocal, application not interpretation thereof is imperative.23
When asked to explain why he decided the election case contradictory to existing law and controlling jurisprudence, respondent judge, pleading good faith, argued that whenever ballots contain obvious markings visible on their faces, the presumption is that said markings on the ballots were placed thereat by the voters themselves, thus nullifying the said ballots.
The reason given by respondent is not well-taken. It contradicts the norm enshrined in the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence.24 The Court has consistently held that laws and statutes governing elections contests especially the appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.25 Respondent's proffered excuse in nullifying the ballots cast in petitioner's favor was thus fittingly overruled by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution dated January 25, 2000 in EAC A-20-98:
We disagree. The movant is relying on an erroneous and misleading presumption. The rule is that no ballot should be discarded as marked unless its character as such is unmistakable. The distinction should always be between marks that were apparently carelessly or innocently made, which do not invalidate the ballot, and marks purposely placed thereon by the voter with a view to possible future identification, which invalidates it. The marks which shall be considered sufficient to invalidate the ballot are those which the voter himself deliberately placed on his ballot for the purpose of identifying it thereafter. In other words, a mark placed on the ballot by a person other than the voter himself does not invalidate the ballot as marked.
There is no legal presumption that the alleged markings were deliberately made by the voter himself and for the purpose of identifying it thereafter. In the absence of any circumstance showing that the intention of the voter to mark the ballot is unmistakable, or any evidence aliunde to show that the words or marks were deliberately written or put therein to identify the ballots, the ballot should not be rejected. In other words, the ballots should be read with reasonable liberality, so that the reading be in favor of the will of the voter, rather than in favor of the inefficiency of the ballot by reason of technical causes.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, as a rule, slight variations in writing are not sufficient to show that the ballot was prepared by two hands and where there is doubt as to whether the names were written by two persons, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the validity of the ballot. Ergo, the declaration by the Commission (Second Division) of the validity of the questioned 111 ballots.
On the other hand, where the ballot shows distinct and marked dissimilarities in writing of the names of some candidates from the rest, the ballot was written by two hands and hence void. And therefore, the invalidation by the Commission (Second Division) of the 13 ballots found with dissimilar handwritings.26
Rendering an erroneous or baseless judgment, in itself, is not sufficient to justify an erring magistrate's dismissal from the service. There must be proof that such judgment was rendered with malice, corrupt motives, improper considerations or bad faith.27 However, "[a]lthough a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by law, there will not only be confusion in the administration of justice but even also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process."28
Respondent's bad faith is aptly pointed out by the Comelec's Second Division in its Resolution dated October 5, 1999 in EAC No. A-20-98:
The trial court's findings after its appreciation of the contested ballots is not only absurd but a complete disappointment and evinces the inadequacy of the court a quo in matters of jurisprudence and the proper application of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code. Every ballot is presumed valid unless there is a clear and good reason to justify its rejection, so the provision states. Whether or not a ballot is written by one or two persons or spurious or marked or defective because of certain infirmities can be determined by a close scrutiny of the face of the ballot and the validity or invalidity thereof can be deduced from the manner the voters prepared their ballots. On this score, the trial court failed.
In a long line of cases decided by the Supreme Court . . . the High Court opined that "it is a well settled rule in election contests that the marks which shall be considered sufficient to invalidate the ballots are those which the voter himself deliberately placed on his ballot for the purpose of identifying it thereafter." In Exhibits "R", "R-1" to "R-28", "R-30" to "R-38", "R-40", "R-42" to "R-44", "R-46", "R-49 to "R-125", a total of 120 ballots for the protestee, the court a quo nullified these ballots because of markings both on the face thereof and the reverse side. Close scrutiny, however, reveals that these so-called markings were placed by the person or persons other than the voters themselves as can be discerned from the strokes and flourishes of the handwriting considering that most, if not all, of the voters are clearly unlearned and the color of the inks undoubtedly differ from that used by the voters. Conversely, the court a quo did not nullify Exhibits "R-29", "R-39", "R-41", "R-45", "R-47" & "R-48" which upon examination contain the same identical markings as the other exhibits and written thereon by the same person or persons.
Corollarily, the court a quo invariably mistook the dots (colored pigmentations) on the faces of the ballots as deliberate markings. Unknown to all and sundry, this is one of the security precautions adopted by the Commission to insure that only authentic and official ballots reach the hands of the voters.
The actuation of the court a quo exemplify the highest degree of prejudice bordering on the criminal if not a gross display of utter ignorance of the law and existing jurisprudence. While it is a truism that the findings of facts by the trial court may not be disturbed on appeal, its appellate jurisdiction allows the Commission to review these findings if there is a showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. In the case at bench, the court committed not only a serious oversight but deliberately misapplied the law and derailed jurisprudence.29 (Emphasis ours)
The presumption of good faith and the regularity in the performance of judicial functions on respondent's part are negated by the foregoing circumstances on record. We agree with the Investigating Justice that given the foregoing circumstances, this is not a case of not knowing or failing to understand legal principles and relevant doctrines but a deliberate disregard of them. Such an omission by respondent of the pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and his application of B.P. Blg. 222 and Section 36 of Comelec Resolution No. 1539, which are applicable exclusively to the election of barangay officials and which are already obsolete, can not simply be brushed away as an honest mistake of judgment or an innocent error in the exercise of discretion. It can only be seen as a deliberate attempt, through the misuse of judicial processes, to give a semblance of merit to a clearly unmeritorious cause and to accord undeserved benefits to the party espousing and promoting the same.
To reiterate, observance of the law which he is bound to know is required of every judge.30 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;31 anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.32 A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.33 It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and the changes therein for ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one, not even judges.34 Indeed, it has been said that —
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.35
The foregoing disquisitions likewise support the charge of manifest partiality because, assuming arguendo that respondent can not be faulted for gross ignorance of the law, he deliberately misapplied and twisted the law in order to favor protestant Rolando Columbres.
There is evidence aliunde which have been adduced to show respondent's bias or partiality in Columbres' favor, referring to two (2) incidents which occurred after the promulgation of respondent's assailed decision on December 7, 1998.
In the first incident, complainant's witness Rosario Omictin testified that on December 21, 1998 she saw respondent together with Columbres waving to the public from the balcony of the San Jacinto Municipal Hall on the latter's assumption of office as Mayor.36 Witness Emmanuel Hipolito likewise confirmed the presence of respondent at the terrace of the municipal building between 9:00 and 9:30 in the morning of December 21, 1998 prior to the service of the writ of execution on complainant.37
Respondent denied his presence in the municipal building on the date mentioned, claiming that "in all of [his] 67 years of life, [he has] never stepped in the municipal building of San Jacinto, Pangasinan."38 In support of this denial, respondent offered the testimony of Sheriff Leo Beltran, his branch sheriff, and the trial calendar for his sala on December 21, 1998.39
However, Beltran's testimony does not refute the claims of Hipolito and Omictin that they both saw respondent at the San Jacinto Municipal Hall in the morning of December 21, 1998. Beltran went to the municipal building much later, particularly at 11:00 a.m. after he had first served the writ of execution on complainant at the church of San Jacinto, Pangasinan.40 It was actually about noontime when Beltran went to the municipal hall to implement the service of the writ because he had to wait for the church wedding rites to finish,41 and he admitted that he never went to the municipal hall until "after the service of the writ."42
Likewise, the trial calendar for December 21, 1998 will not extricate respondent from his predicament. It does not clearly show that respondent actually conducted hearings in the morning of December 21, 1998 and, if so, for how long and what time he started and ended such hearings. What is worse is that said calendar shows that all cases were reset except for only one, which was heard ex parte. It was not even indicated whether said ex parte hearing was conducted by respondent judge himself or merely by the branch clerk of court. At any rate, the better evidence to show how long and up to what time respondent conducted the hearings in the morning of December 21, 1998 are the minutes of the morning session of that day, which the respondent did not produce.
The second incident allegedly occurred on December 18, 1998 at the Northern Paradise Resort in San Jacinto, Pangasinan, where respondent judge was again seen with Columbres. Witnesses Rosario Omictin and her daughter, Risacris Mae Omictin, positively identified respondent judge at the Northern Paradise Resort in the "late afternoon" of December 18, 1998.43 In her testimony, Rosario Omictin more specifically put the time at around 6:00 in the afternoon.44 Upon questioning by the Investigating Justice, Rosario Omictin explained that when she arrived at the Northern Paradise Resort, she saw Columbres leaving the place,45 although upon reaching the resort gate she saw Columbres talking to the respondent.46 Just as damaging is the picture47 taken by Rosario Omictin of her daughter Risacris with respondent and the Caramat spouses in the background, which was identified by both mother and daughter. Most damning of all is the unrebutted testimony of Rosario Omictin that she was summoned by respondent and Columbres and reprimanded for taking the picture and executing the affidavit.48
To controvert the foregoing declarations of Rosario and Risacris, respondent again denied having been at the Northern Paradise Resort,49 and offered the testimony of Noli Caramat as well as the trial calendar for December 18, 1998 in support thereof.
An assiduous examination of Caramat's testimonial declarations, however, leaves the Court unconvinced of his credibility as a witness. On direct examination, he categorically declared that the picture which shows respondent was taken in June 1998.50 Upon being grilled by complainant's counsel, he made the following revealing statements:
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
My only question, Mr. Caramat is, if you were not in the resort the whole day of December 18, 1998, how are you able to say that Judge Sison was not there at any time on December 18, 1998?
WITNESS:
Judge Sison was not there because I was not there too, sir.
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
Do you also mean to say that Judge Sison was never there in any day in December 1998 or only Mayor Columbres?
WITNESS:
No. Either Mr. Columbres was not there also.
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
Anytime in December 1998?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
You are able to say that because you were there and your wife was also there everytime that the resort was open in December 1998?
WITNESS:
No, sir.
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
So, how are you able to say that then?
WITNESS:
Actually Attorney, we are not the ones who are opening the resort. It is our employees. We drop [by] at the resort very minimal[ly] because we have to attend to our other businesses, sir.51
The foregoing renders Mr. Caramat's statement that respondent was not in the Northern Paradise Resort on December 18, 1998 purely hearsay. Worse, while Caramat vaguely implied in his affidavit52 that respondent judge was not in the resort "on any day after the May 1998 elections," he later made a volte face in his testimony53 which only added further to the confusion.
The trial calendar of respondent's court on December 18, 199854 is likewise inconclusive to show that he was not at the Northern Paradise Resort. For one thing, the calendar indicates that there were only two (2) cases scheduled for 2:00 p.m. on said date. Moreover, there is nothing in the calendar which even remotely hints that hearings were actually held in the afternoon of the said date. Indeed, by respondent's own admission,55 the Northern Paradise Resort is only forty (40) minutes away from his sala. He does not even remember how long he held the sessions on December 18, 1998, but he declared that he usually leaves his office at 5:00 p.m.56
The Canons of Judicial Ethics provide that:
Rule 2.00 — A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Rule 2.01 — A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. Hence, the judge must, at all times, maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality. His language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.57 A judge's conduct must be above reproach.58 Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion.59 A judge's private as well as official conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety and be beyond reproach.60
Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance.61 It was, thus, held that it is improper for a judge to meet privately with the accused without the presence of the complainant.62 Needless to state, privately meeting with a litigant in a resort and later being seen with him waving to the public while his judgment in favor of said litigant was being implemented seriously undermines even more the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary.
The Court notes that aside from this case, respondent has been charged seven (7) other times.63 Of these cases three (3) have been dismissed,64 while two (2) are still pending.65 The court also notes that respondent has been repeatedly charged with gross ignorance of the law and has been penalized or sanctioned on two (2) occasions. Indeed, in A.M. No. RTJ-90-532, respondent was admonished while in A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, he was fined P20,000.00 and sternly warned that a commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. It need not be overemphasized the such an unflattering record only erodes further the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary.
Case law repeatedly teaches that judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon which he must pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice.66 A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct beyond which he may not freely venture.67 He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach.68 The irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary.69 It is thus the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.70
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties.71 They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiment of the people's sense of justice.72 Thus, judicial conduct should remain free from any appearance of impropriety and should be beyond reproach.73
In the case at bar, respondent has shamed the judiciary by deliberately applying not only patently inapplicable but also already repealed laws. He tainted the image of the judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it at all times unsullied and worthy of the people's trust.74 For this the Court believes that the recommended penalty is warranted.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and manifest partiality, and is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges and with prejudice to reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.
Quisumbing, J ., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 1-2.
2 Ibid., pp. 3-13.
3 Id., p. 15.
4 Id., p. 14.
5 Id., pp. 16-18.
6 Citing In re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405 [1995].
7 Rollo, p. 22.
8 Ibid., pp. 23-25.
9 Annexes A-S, pp. 26-150, passim.
10 Rollo, p. 159.
11 Ibid., pp. 162-178.
12 Id., pp. 194-199.
13 Id., pp. 180-181.
14 Id., pp. 201-208.
15 206 SCRA 305 [1992].
16 Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 5.
17 B.P. Blg. 881.
18 R.A. No. 6646.
19 R.A. No. 7166.
20 Januario Lotino v. Judge Porfirio G. Macaraeg, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1542, 16 March 2000.
21 Hermogenes T. Gozun v. Hon. Daniel B. Liangco, A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136, 30 August 2000, citing Romulo SJ Tolentino v. Judge Alfredo A. Cabral, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1528, 28 March 2000; Carlito C. Aguilar v. Judge Victor A. Dalanao, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1275, 8 June 2000.
22 Hold Departure Order Issued By Judge Felipe M. Abalos, MTCC-Branch 1, Dipolog City in Criminal Cases Nos. 15521 & 15522, 319 SCRA 131 (1999), citing Re: Hold Departure Order Dated April 13, 1998 Issued By Judge Juan C. Nartatez, MTCC-Branch 3, Davao City, 298 SCRA 710 [1998].
23 Perez v. Concepcion, 321 SCRA 284 [1999].
24 Canon 3, Rule 3.01.
25 Pangandaman v. COMELEC, 319 SCRA 283 [1999].
26 Rollo, pp. 196-198; citations omitted.
27 De Vera v. Dames, 310 SCRA 213 [1999]; see also Abundo v. Manio, 312 SCRA 1 [1999].
28 Sanchez v. Vestil, 298 SCRA 1 [1998]; Daiz v. Judge Asadon, 290 SCRA 561 [1998].
29 Rollo, pp. 174-177; citations omitted.
30 Hermo v. Dela Rosa, 299 SCRA 68 [1998].
31 Bacor v. De Guzman, 271 SCRA 328 [1997].
32 Creer v. Concordio L. Fabillar, Acting Judge, MCTC, Giporlos-Quinapundan, Eastern Samar, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1218, 14 August 2000.
33 Mamolo, Sr. v. Narisma, 252 SCRA 283 [1996].
34 Cacayoren v. Judge Hilarion A. Suller, 7th MCTC, Asingan-San Manuel, Pangasinan, A.M. Nos. MTJ-97-1132 & MTJ-97-1133, 24 October 2000, citing Aurillo v. Francisco, 235 SCRA 283 [1994].
35 Rodriguez v. Judge Rodolfo R. Bonifacio, RTC, Branch 151, Pasig City, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510, 6 November 2000, citing Cortes v. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 1 [1997].
36 TSN, [a.m.] 28 March 2000, pp. 57-61.
37 Ibid., pp. 35-37.
38 Id., [p.m.], p. 144.
39 Exhibit 9.
40 TSN, [p.m.] 28 March 2000, pp. 20-22.
41 Ibid., pp. 49-51.
42 Id., p. 55.
43 Exhibit B, Omictin's Affidavit.
44 TSN, [a.m.] 28 March 2000, p. 64.
45 Ibid., pp. 90-92.
46 Id., pp. 109-110.
47 Exhibit C.
48 TSN, [a.m.] 28 March 2000, p. 106.
49 Ibid., [p.m.], p. 148.
50 Id., [p.m.] pp. 84-86.
51 Id., pp. 101-104.
52 Exhibit 6.
53 TSN [p.m.] 28 March 2000, pp. 105-108.
54 Exhibit 8.
55 TSN, [p.m.] 28 March 2000, pp. 148-150.
56 Ibid., pp. 149-150.
57 De Vera v. Dames, supra; People v. Serrano, 203 SCRA 171 [1991], citing Fecundo v. Berjamen, 180 SCRA 235 [1989].
58 Canon 31, Canons of Judicial Ethics.
59 Palang v. Zosa, 58 SCRA 776 [1974].
60 Magarang v. Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., A.M. No. RTJ-99-1448, 6 April 2000, citing Dysico v. Dacumos, 262 SCRA 275 [1996].
61 Gacayan, v. Hon. Fernando Vil Pamintuan, 314 SCRA 682 [1999], citing Cortes v. Agcaoili, supra.
62 Gallo v. Cordero, 245 SCRA 219 [1995].
63 1.] IPI No. 98-504-RTJ for Rendering an Unjust Judgment;
2.] RTJ-90-532 for Ignorance of the Law:
3.] RTJ-92-804 for Grave Misconduct;
4.] RTJ-92-822 for Ignorance of the Law;
5.] RTJ-94-1155 for Rendering an Unjust Judgment;
6.] A.M. No. 92-7-360-0 for Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion;
7.] MTJ-87-52 for Ignorance of the Law.
64 1.] RTJ-94-1155;
2.] RTJ-92-804;
3.] MTJ-87-52.
65 1.] IPI No. 98-504-RTJ;
2.] RTJ-92-822.
66 Apiag v. Cantero, 268 SCRA 47 [1997].
67 Dacera v. Judge Teodoro A. Dizon, Jr., RTC, Branch 37, General Santos City, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1573, 2 August 2000.
68 Villaluz Vda. de Enriquez v. Judge Jaime F. Bautista, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1439, 9 May 2000, citing San Juan v. Bagalasca, 283 SCRA 416 [1997].
69 Panganiban v. Guererro, Jr., 242 SCRA 11 [1995].
70 Galang v. Judge Abelardo H. Santos, 307 SCRA 582 [1999], citing Nazareno v. Almario, 268 SCRA 657 [1997].
71 Dawa v. Judge De Asa, 292 SCRA 703 [1998].
72 Rallos, et al. v. Judge Irineo Lee Gako, Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu City, A.M. Nos. RTJ-99-1484 & RTJ-99-1484 (A), 17 March 2000; Marces v. Arcangel, 258 SCRA 503 [1996].
73 Calilung v. Judge Wilfredo Suriaga, A.M. Nos. MTJ-99-1191 & RTJ-99-1437, 31 August 2000.
74 Garcia v. Dela Pena, 229 SCRA 766 [1994].
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1354 April 4, 2001
JUANITO AGULAN, JR., complainant,
vs.
JUDGE OCTAVIO A. FERNANDEZ, formerly of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Gen. M. Natividad-Llanera, Nueva Ecija and presently Acting Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bansalan-Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Complainant Juanito Agulan, Jr. and his son Ian Agulan were separately charged with violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms) as amended, before the MCTC-General M. Natividad-Llanera, Nueva Ecija then presided by respondent Judge Octavio A. Fernandez.1 Upon preliminary investigation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 168-L and 169-L and a finding of probable cause, respondent Judge issued warrants of arrest and recommended bail in the amount of P120,000.00 for each of the accused. Before the warrants could be served, the police prosecutor interceded in behalf of the herein complainant and requested respondent Judge to defer the execution of the warrants and allow the accused to put up a cash bail bond in the reduced amount of P36,000.00 each. Respondent Judge acceded to the request and accepted the amount of P72,000.00 as cash bail bond for both accused. Respondent Judge recalled the warrants of arrest and ordered the release of the accused from custody in his Order dated March 25, 1999.2
In a letter-complaint dated September 29, 1999 addressed to the Chief Justice, herein complainant stated that Teresita Esteban, the Clerk of Court of the MCTC, Natividad-Llanera, Nueva Ecija issued a Certification dated September 22, 1999, to the effect that she did not issue any receipt regarding the cash bonds for the reason both the accused "did not file their cash bonds to the undersigned."3 Complainant intimated that respondent Judge did not deposit the cash he accepted and had misappropriated it, and requested that an investigation be made on this matter.
Asked to comment by the Court Administrator on the above mentioned letter-complaint, respondent Judge, in his Letter-Comment dated March 7, 2000, admitted having accepted the cash bail bond in the amount of P72,000.00 but vehemently denied the charge of misappropriation. He claimed that he accepted the cash bonds because it was already night time and the Municipal Treasurer’s Office was already closed and that he acted out of compassion in accepting the cash bonds.
It appears that Judge Fernandez was designated as acting Presiding Judge of MCTC, Bansalan, Magsaysay, Davao Del Sur on August 27, 1999, and Judge Efren Mallare took over as acting Presiding Judge of MCTC-Gen. Natividad-Llanera, Nueva Ecija. In an Order dated April 26, 2000, the criminal cases against herein complainant and his son were dismissed by Judge Mallare.
In a letter dated May 9, 2000 addressed to the Court Administrator, herein complainant stated that respondent Judge had fully restituted the amount of P72,000.00, P36,000.00 in cash and P36,000.00 in personal check, and that he is withdrawing his administrative complaint against respondent Judge.
The case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for Investigation, Report and Recommendation. (Ret.) Justice Narciso Atienza, consultant in the Office of the Court Administrator, conducted a hearing and submitted his Report. He stated that Rule 114 specifically mentions the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be deposited namely: the collector of internal revenue, or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer, and that a judge is not one of those mentioned therein and he should not have accepted the money deposited. Moreover, the order of release issued by respondent judge did not comply with the Rules. The report stated:
"The order of release issued by the respondent is illegal for the requirements of Section 11, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, was not complied with particularly the submission of the proper certificate of deposit issued by any of the persons authorized by law to accept cash bail bond, and the written undertaking showing compliance with Section 2 of Rule 114. The order is neither a certificate of proper deposit nor a written undertaking as required by law. The respondent did not even require the accused to submit photographs showing the face, left and right profiles.
Respondent testified that he was not able to deposit the cash bail bonds posted by the accused with the municipal treasurer because the treasurer was not in his office when he went there. This is a lame excuse because, assuming that the Municipal treasurer was not in his office when the respondent went there, if he really did, certainly there must be other personnel in the office of the municipal treasurer who could accept the cash bail bonds and issue the corresponding receipt. If respondent had no time going back to the office of the municipal treasurer, he should have turned over the money to the Clerk of Court and order her deposit the same to any of the government officials mentioned in the law.
After Criminal Cases Nos. 168-L and 169-L were dismissed sometime in February, 2000, complainant’s counsel filed a motion for the release of the cash bail bonds. The Clerk of Court was not able to release the money because it was in the possession of the respondent who was then at his station in MCTC Bansalan-Magsaysay, Davao del Sur. The money was released only on May 9, 2000, after respondent issued an order dated April 26, 2000, ordering the Clerk of Court to release the money which came from him, P36,000.00 of which was in cash and P36,000.00 was in respondent’s personal check.
Seventy Two Thousand Pesos (P72,000.00) in cash was received by the respondent as cash bail bonds from the complainant. What was released to complainant, however, was P36,000.00 cash and 36,000.00 in check which is a clear proof that money posted as cash bail bonds was used by the respondent. The allegation of the respondent that the office of the Municipal Treasurer refused to issue receipt in view of on going reorganization in the office is a devious excuse to keep the posted cash bail bonds in his possession. Respondent’s action placed his integrity in serious doubt."
The Investigating Justice recommends that respondent Judge be penalized with a fine of P2,000.00. The Court Administrator recommended approval of the Report.
We find the recommendation of the Court Administrator well-taken, but resolve to increase the penalty.
At the hearing of this administrative case, herein complainant testified that he was detained at the time he gave the amount of P72,000.00 to respondent Judge at around 2:00 P.M. and that the latter gave him the Order of Release while in custody.4 He further testified that he was not given a receipt by respondent Judge who told him that the clerk of court would issue a receipt;5 and that when he posted the cash bail bond, it was "all in cash", but when the said amount was returned to him, P36,000.00 was in the form of check and P36,000.00 was in the form of cash.6
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, testified that he received the amount of P72,000.00 at around 9:00 P.M. and placed the money in a safety deposit box in his own office; that from March 1999 when the cash bail bond was deposited until August 26 or 29, 1999 when he was detailed in Davao, he did not give the money to the clerk of court; that he was supposed to deposit the money with the municipal treasurer but since the latter was out at the time, he informed the clerk of court that the amount was deposited with him (respondent); that he was not able to deposit the money with the municipal treasurer because the latter was on leave and the assistant treasurer informed him that they could not issue any receipt until such time that the reorganization of the treasurer’s office would be completed; hence respondent Judge instead issued a certificate of deposit and attached it to the records of the case.7
The rules specify the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be deposited namely: the collector of internal revenue, or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. Section 148 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000) provides:
"Sec. 14. Deposit of Cash as Bail. – The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and of a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit." (underscoring supplied).
A judge is not one of those authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail, nor should such cash be kept in the office of the judge.
Respondent Judge’s explanation that he was not able to deposit the cash bail bond with the municipal treasurer because the latter was not in his office when he went there, is a lame excuse. As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Justice, even assuming that the municipal treasurer was not in his office when respondent Judge went there, certainly there would be other personnel authorized to receive and accept the cash bail bond and issue the corresponding receipt. If respondent Judge did not have the time to go back to the municipal treasurer’s office, he could have directed his clerk of court to deposit the same with any of the government officials mentioned in the rules.
The proper procedure in the handling of cash submitted or given to the municipal court as bail bond is for the court to formally direct the clerk of court to officially receive the cash and to immediately deposit it with the municipal treasurer’s office. The transaction must not only be properly receipted for but should also appear in the records of the case.9
Clearly, respondent Judge disregarded the rules on the posting of bail. The alleged plea by the accused not to be incarcerated since it was already night time is not a valid reason for respondent Judge’s acceptance of the cash and depositing it in the office instead of with the officials named in the Rules. He violated the rules by receiving the money and by keeping the cash bond in the safety deposit box in his office to await the final outcome of the case.10
As it turned out, when the amount of P72,000.00 which was admittedly received and accepted by respondent Judge in March 1999 was returned and released on May 9, 2000, upon motion of herein complainant in view of the dismissal of the criminal cases against the latter, but the amount returned consisted of P36,000.00 in the form of a personal check of respondent Judge and P36,000.00 in cash. There was no credible explanation as to why respondent Judge issued his personal check for the P36,000.00 when the entire amount of P72,000.00 was supposed to be deposited in the office vault by his own account. Respondent Judge testified:
"JUSTICE ATIENZA:
Now, from March of 1999 up to the date that you were detailed to Davao why did you not give the money to the Clerk of Court?
WITNESS:
What happened, Your Honor, was that the Clerk of Court. . . I was supposed to give the money to the municipal treasurer because that was the provision of the revised rules that the money deposited must be with the municipal treasurer but since the municipal/provincial treasurer was out at that time I informed the Clerk of Court that the amount was already deposited to me and she said that since the amount was there and the order of release was already made, well she would not receive the money and so she did not issue any receipt but with an understanding that anytime the case will be disposed of we will just follow the rules of court that we will release the amount after the final outcome of the case.
JUSTICE ATIENZA:
Judge, according to the complainant here the P36,000.00 was in cash and the P36,000.00 was in check, now why did you issue the check when the money was intact in the vault where you placed it?
WITNESS:
Well, what happened, Your Honor, when I was already in Davao City and they informed me about the fact that there was a finality of the judgment, since the complainant was also a friend of mine just to be sure that he’ll be receiving the amount and there will be no more question because he needs it, I told my spouse and I myself decided that I will put up my own personal check because I am maintaining a personal check.
JUSTICE ATIENZA:
How about the cash, the P36,000.00 in cash which represented the check?
WITNESS:
This is what happened, Your Honor, last week of August of 1999 when I was leaving for Davao City because of an Administrative Order my Clerk of Court received an amount from our collection in the office and exactly I left the amount of more than P300,000.00 to the Clerk of Court and so I also at that time received a commission of about P250,000.00 from the sale of a little property of ours in Davao City, I received it because of the conclusion of the sale, so I told my clerk of court that that amount of P300,000.00 will be returned in their possession and she was thinking probably that there will be any question about the return of this amount because my detail in Davao was temporary, so I told her she was giving me some amount for some extra expenses. I told them I will not need any amount because I received on or about that time a commission of about P250,000.00 from the sale of our family property in Davao.
JUSTICE ATIENZA:
Yes, but my question to you is, what happened to the P36,000.00 in cash which was replaced by the check?
WITNESS:
It was there, I left it with the Office, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ATIENZA:
After issuing a check did you get the P36,000.00?
WITNESS:
I did not.
JUSTICE ATIENZA:
Where is the money now, still there? The P36,000.00 which was represented by the check?
WITNESS:
It was already in replacement of the check, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ATIENZA:
So, you got the P36,000.00 and replaced it with the check?
WITNESS:
That is what happened, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ATIENZA:
Now, according to you, you were not able to deposit it with the treasurer because the treasurer was not available, was the treasurer on leave?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ATIENZA:
For how long?
WITNESS:
That time if I could remember it right I think the complainant will also confirm it, the treasurer’s office was some sort of a re-organization and so I went to the Asst. Treasurer and one of the employees of the treasurer by the name of Grace Abiog informed me that in the meantime they could not also issue any receipt until such time that the reorganization of the Treasurer’s office will be completed, so I issued a certificate of deposit and attached it in the records of this case which is also one of my intention, Your Honor, just to be sure that there is an acknowledgement of my office of the deposit of the amount.
JUSTICE ATIENZA:
This is the certificate of deposit which you are referring to?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ATIENZA:
To the effect that you received the amount of P72,000.00 cash?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ATIENZA:
As the bail bonds for the Agulans?
JUSTICE ATIENZA:
Yes, Your Honor."
Indeed, as observed by the investigating justice, respondent’s failure to comply with the rules regarding the procedure for acceptance and disposition of cash bail bonds "placed his integrity in serious doubt," particularly when he replaced part of the cash bond with his personal check without any acceptable explanation.
The penalty of fine in the amount of P2,000.00 recommended by the Investigating Justice and approved by the Court of Administrator is too light considering the seriousness of the infraction committed by respondent Judge. A fine in the amount of P5,000.00 is reasonable.
Time and again this Court has ruled that it is the duty of a member of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the Judiciary.11 A judge’s official conduct should be free from any appearance of impropriety. He must not act in a way that would cast suspicion in order to preserve the faith in the administration of justice.12 In the case of public servants who are in the judiciary, their conduct and behavior, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but above all else, must be above suspicion.13
Finally, the mere fact that herein complainant sent a letter requesting for the withdrawal of the instant administrative case does not warrant the dismissal thereof. Desistance made by complainant is of no moment. Settled is the rule that in administrative cases of this nature, the Court may proceed with its investigation and mete the appropriate penalty against erring officers of the court.14 Administrative actions cannot be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. This Court does not, as a matter of course, dismiss administrative cases against members of the bench on account of withdrawal of charges.15
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Octavio A. Fernandez is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely by this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 presently, Acting Presiding Judge of the MCTC-Bansalan-Magsaysay, Davao del Sur.
2 Annex "B", Rollo.
3 Annex "A", Rollo.
4 pp. 3-4, TSN, November 22, 2000.
5 p. 7, ibid.
6 p. 11, ibid.
7 pp. 18-21, ibid.
8 Section 14, Rule 114 as amended by SC Administrative Circular No. 12-94 (which took effect on October 1, 1994) provides: "SEC. 14. Deposit of Cash as Bail. – The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case and upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and of a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of Section 2 hereof, the accused shall be discharged from custody. Money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit."
9 Daag vs. Serrano, 118 SCRA 381.
10 p. 19, TSN, November 22, 2000.
11 Galang vs. Santos, 307 SCRA 582; Lorena vs. Encomienda, 302 SCRA 632.
12 Office of the Court Administrator vs. De Guzman, Jr., 267 SCRA 291.
13 Lacuata vs. Bautista, 235 SCRA 290.
14 Cabilao vs. Sardido, 246 SCRA 94; Marcelino vs. Singson, Jr., 243 SCRA 685.
15 Sandoval vs. Manalo, 260 SCRA 611.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA March 27, 2001
IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS CHARGING COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO DEMETRIA WITH INTERFERENCE ON BEHALF OF A SUSPECTED DRUG QUEEN:
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity, fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates of justice must always be fair and impartial. They should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all appearances of impropriety. Their influence in society must be consciously and conscientiously exercised with utmost prudence and discretion. For, theirs is the assigned role of preserving the independence, impartiality and integrity of the Judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency."1 The slightest form of interference cannot be countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to derail or interfere in the regular course of a legal or judicial proceeding for the benefit of one or any of the parties therein, public confidence in the judicial system is diminished, if not totally eroded.
Such is this administrative charge triggered by newspaper accounts which appeared on the 21 July 2000 issues of The Manila Standard, The Manila Times, Malaya, The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today. The national dailies collectively reported that Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out of prison to play in a Manila casino.2
That same day, 21 July 2000, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., issued a Memorandum to Justice Demetria directing him to comment on the derogatory allegations in the news items.3 On 24 July 2000, Justice Demetria submitted his Compliance. Subsequently, Chief State Prosecutor (CSP) Jovencito R. Zuño, who disclosed to the media the name of Justice Demetria, and State Prosecutor (SP) Pablo C. Formaran III, a member of the Task Force on Anti-Narcotics Cases of the Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecuting the case of the suspected Chinese drug queen, filed their respective Comments on the Compliance of Justice Demetria.4
On 8 August 2000, the Court En Banc ordered an investigation and designated Mme. Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino as Investigator and Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo as Prosecutor. An investigation then commenced on 22 August 2000 and continued until 16 November 2000.
The Prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, CSP Zuño, SP Formaran III, Agnes P. Tuason, secretary of SP Formaran, III, and Jose H. Afalla, an employee from the Office of Asst. CSP (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab, Jr. The defense on the other hand presented ten (10) witnesses: respondent Justice Demetria, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP) Severino Gaña, Jr., Senior State Prosecutor (SSP) Romeo Dañosos, Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai, MTC Judge Orlando Siapno, Peter Young, Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok, Danilo J. Mijares, bodyguard of Go Teng Kok, and Luisito Artiaga, official of the Philippine Amateur Track and Field Association (PATAFA).
The facts as borne out by the evidence presented by the prosecution are quite clear. In an Information dated 9 December 1998, SP Formaran III charged Yu Yuk Lai, together with her supposed nephew, a certain Kenneth Monceda y Sy alias William Sy, before the RTC of Manila, Br. 18,5 with violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425, as amended, for "conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent and without authority of law . . . (to) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) kilograms, more or less, of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), which is a regulated drug."6 Accused of non-bailable offense, both Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda were held at the detention cell of the PNP Narcotics Group in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 25 June 1999, accused Yu Yuk Lai filed a Petition for Bail on the ground that the evidence of her guilt was not strong.
On 10 November 1999, upon receiving information that the accused, especially Yu Yuk Lai, had been seen regularly playing in the casinos of Heritage Hotel and the Holiday Inn Pavilion, SP Formaran III filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Transfer the Detention of the Accused to the City Jail.7 On the same day, Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., granted the motion and ordered the immediate transfer of the two (2) accused to the Manila City Jail.8
On 18 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., concluded that "the evidence standing alone and unrebutted, is strong and sufficient to warrant conviction of the two accused for the crime charged" and denied the petition for bail of accused Yu Yuk Lai for lack of merit.9 Consequently, both accused filed a Joint Motion for Inhibition arguing that the trial court's actuation "do not inspire the belief that its decision would be just and impartial."10 On 28 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., believing that the joint motion was utterly without merit but considering the gravity of the offense and for the peace of mind of the accused, inhibited himself.11
The case was re-raffled to Branch 53, presided by Judge Angel V. Colet. Accused Yu Yuk Lai then filed a Motion to Order the Confinement of the Accused in a Hospital. Before Judge Colet could resolve the motion, the case was handled by the Branch's Pairing Judge Manuel T. Muro.
On 15 May 2000 Judge Muro granted accused Yu Yuk Lai's motion and allowed her to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for a period not exceeding seven (7) days,12 contrary to the recommendation of Dr. Jose Estrada Rosal, Chief of the Health Services of the Manila City Jail, that Yu Yuk Lai be confined at the Philippine General Hospital.13
On 5 June 2000 Judge Muro granted Yu Yuk Lai's Urgent Motion for Extension of Medical Confinement "for a period of one (1) month, or until such time that she is fit to be discharged from the said hospital."14 On 7 July 2000 Judge Muro also granted Yu Yuk Lai's Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Admit Demurrer to Evidence.15 Soon, rumors circulated in the Manila City Hall that Judge Muro was partial towards accused Yu Yuk Lai.
The rumors did not end there. On 6 July 2000 unidentified employees of the RTC Manila calling themselves "CONCERNED COURT EMPLOYEES" wrote the Secretary of Justice, copy furnished the Chief State Prosecutor, the Ombudsman, and Judge Muro. The letter alleged that Judge Muro ordered the hospitalization of Yu Yuk Lai "even if she (was) not sick and there (was) already a rumor circulating around the City Hall, that the notorious Judge had given the go signal to the counsel of the accused to file the Motion to Quash, which (would) be granted for a consideration of millions of pesos and the contact person (was) allegedly the daughter of the Judge, who is an employee in the said branch."16
Accordingly on 14 July 2000, SP Formaran III filed a Motion for Inhibition praying that Judge Muro inhibit himself "from further handling this case and/or from resolving the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused Yu Yuk Lai as well as any other pending incidents therein."17
On 16 July 2000, at around 7:30 o'clock in the morning, while she was supposed to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital, accused Yu Yuk Lai was arrested inside the VIP room of the Casino Filipino at the Holiday Inn Pavilion, Manila, while playing baccarat. She was unescorted at the time of her arrest.
On 18 July 2000, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro was heard and submitted for resolution. Later, at around 11:30 o'clock, when SP Formaran III arrived in his office from the hearing, he was informed by his secretary, Agnes Tuason, that the staff of Court of Appeals Justice Demetrio Demetria had called earlier and said that the Justice wanted to speak with him. The caller requested for a return call. As requested, SP Formaran III immediately returned the call of Justice Demetria but the Justice had already gone out for lunch.
Later in the afternoon, between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock, Justice Demetria, PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok and a close friend of Justice Demetria, went to the office of SP Formaran III in the DOJ which SP Formaran III shares with SP Albert Fonacier. Apparently, Justice Demetria was not familiar with SP Formaran III as he greeted SP Fonacier "Kamusta ka, Prosecutor Formaran?"18
Soon the visitors were seated. Go Teng Kok immediately pleaded with SP Formaran III to withdraw his motion to inhibit Judge Muro as this would purportedly delay the resolution of the case. Go Teng Kok also expressed his apprehension that if Judge Muro would inhibit, a new judge might convict his friend, accused Yu Yuk Lai, who was then already receiving bad publicity.
Justice Demetria then asked about the status of the case. SP Formaran III informed the Justice that a motion for inhibition has been submitted for resolution, one basis of which was the unsigned letter of the concerned court employees. Justice Demetria opined that it was a bit dangerous to anchor the inhibition of a judge on an unsigned, anonymous letter. The Justice then advised Go Teng Kok who was becoming persistent to "keep his cool" and asked SP Formaran III if he could do something to help Go Teng Kok. Apparently, prior to 18 July 2000, Go Teng Kok had already been asking SP Formaran III to go slow in prosecuting accused Yu Yuk Lai.19 SP Formaran III at first politely declined the request. But later, "just to put an end to (the) conversation," 20 he told them that he would bring the matter to CSP Zuño. "Iyon pala," Justice Demetria replied. The Justice then stood up, bade good bye and left. Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok followed closely behind.21
Thereafter, SP Formaran III went to see CSP Zuño and informed the latter of what had transpired. CSP Zuño replied, "No way!" SP Formaran III also told ACSP Guiyab, Jr., who gave the same reply.22
At around 3:00 o'clock that same afternoon, CSP Zuño received a call from Justice Demetria who requested him to instruct SP Formaran III to withdraw the motion for inhibition of Judge Muro so that the Judge could already issue an order. "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na i-withdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa na ng Order si Judge Muro," Justice Demetria was quoted as saying.23 Politely, CSP Zuño said that he would see what he could do. "Tingnan ko po kung ano ang magagawa ko."24
On 20 July 2000, The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that a "Supreme Court Justice . . . and an outspoken sports person and leader"25 had been exerting "undue pressure" on the DOJ to go slow in prosecuting re-arrested drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. That same afternoon, the names of Justice Demetria and Mr. Go Teng Kok were disclosed to the media to clear the name of the Supreme Court justices who might have been affected by the erroneous news report. The following day, 21 July 2000, several newspapers named Justice Demetria and Go Teng Kok as "drug lawyers."
Also on 20 July 2000 the DOJ received a copy of an Order dated 19 July 2000 of Judge Muro inhibiting himself from further hearing the case of Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda.26
Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently denied having interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. While he admitted that he indeed visited the DOJ on 18 July 2000, he went there to "visit old friends" and his meeting Go Teng Kok whom he did not know until that time was purely accidental. Expectedly, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok corroborated the claim of respondent Justice.
Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP Formaran III "to do something to help Go Teng Kok about the case" without ever specifying the kind of "help" that he requested. He averred that it was purely on the basis of erroneous impression and conjecture on the part of SP Formaran III that he impliedly asked him to withdraw the motion "because that is what Mr. Go Teng Kok was appealing and requesting."27 Respondent claimed that the "help" he was requesting could well be "within legal bounds or line of duty."
Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else during the discussion between Go Teng Kok and SP Formaran III, such was not a form of intervention. He only admonished Go Teng Kok "to cool it" when the discussion between the prosecutor and Go Teng Kok became heated. While he asked about the status of the case this, he said, demonstrated his lack of knowledge about the case and bolstered his claim that he could not have possibly interceded for Yu Yuk Lai.
Respondent Justice likewise argued that the bases of his identification by CSP Zuño as the Justice exerting undue pressure on the DOJ were all hearsay. Respondent submitted that CSP Zuño based his identification from a newspaper account, from the statement of his secretary that it was he (Justice Demetria) who was on the other end of the telephone and from SP Formaran III when the latter consulted the Chief State Prosecutor about the visit of the Justice and Go Teng Kok impliedly asking him to withdraw the motion.
In defense of respondent Justice, Atty. Paas stated that it was actually he, not Justice Demetria, who later called up CSP Zuño to inquire about the latter's decision regarding the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit since SP Formaran III had earlier told Go Teng Kok that the matter would be taken up with his superiors.
In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is inconceivable for him to ask SP Formaran III whom he just met for the first time to do something for Go Teng Kok whom he claims he just likewise met for the first time. Neither did he know Yu Yuk Lai, a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself corroborated. It would be unthinkable for him to intercede in behalf of someone he did not know. Indeed respondent Justice asserted that his meeting Go Teng Kok on 18 July 2000 at the DOJ was purely coincidence, if not accidental.
So, did respondent Justice Demetria really intercede in behalf of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai?
Investigating Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino believes so. In her Report dated 5 January 2001, she found respondent Justice Demetria "guilty of violating Rule 2.04, Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct" and recommended that "appropriate disciplinary action be taken against him by this Honorable Court."28
Only rightly so. The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming, and damning. Thus, even the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, after a hearing, found that "there was a conspiracy to commit the following offenses on the part of CA Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria and PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Miss Yu Yuk Lai: obstruction of justice punishable under PD No. 1829 and Article 3(a) of RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."29
While Justice Demetria vehemently denied interfering with the criminal case, his denial cannot stand against the positive assertions of CSP Zuño and SP Formaran III,30 which are consistent with natural human experience. To accept the testimony of the defense witnesses that it was Atty. Paas who telephoned CSP Zuño, and not Justice Demetria, and that the "help" the respondent Justice was requesting SP Formaran III was something "within legal bounds or line of duty" other than the withdrawal of the motion is to strain too far one's imagination.
The testimony of CSP Zuño is plainly unambiguous and indubitably consistent with the other facts and circumstances surrounding the case —
CSP Zuño: As far as I could recall Justice Demetria said, "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro."31
In his discussion with Go Teng Kok and Justice Demetria, SP Formaran III said that he would consult his superiors regarding the proposal to withdraw the motion. The timely telephone call to CSP Zuño was thus a logical follow-up. And no one could have made the call except respondent Justice since it is not uncommon for anyone to believe that CSP Zuño would recognize the voice of respondent Justice who was CSP Zuño's former superior in the DOJ. Thus, the confident utterance "[p]akisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro" could not have come from anyone else but from respondent Justice who had moral ascendancy over CSP Zuño, he being a Justice of the Court of Appeals and a former Undersecretary and at one time Acting Secretary of the DOJ.
Even the requested "help" for Go Teng Kok, whom respondent Justice claims he did not know and met only that time, could not have meant any other assistance but the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro. True, Justice Demetria never categorically asked SP Formaran III to withdraw his Motion. But when respondent Justice Demetria asked the state prosecutor at that particular time "to do something . . . to help Mr. Go Teng Kok," the latter was pleading for the withdrawal of the motion, and nothing else. That was the only form of "help" that Go Teng Kok wanted. The subtle pressure exerted simply pointed to one particular act. Thus, subsequently respondent Justice called CSP Zuño to ask for just that — the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro.
Justice Demetria also claimed that he, together with Atty. Paas, went to the DOJ, first, to see Secretary Artemio Tuquero and seek assistance in the appointment of Atty. Paas to the Court of Appeals, and second, to "visit old friends,"32 and that the meeting with Go Teng Kok was purely accidental. But respondent Justice never mentioned in his earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that his primary purpose in going to the DOJ was to see Sec. Tuquero, and since Sec. Tuquero was not in, he instead decided to see some officials/prosecutors whom he had not visited for a long time.
We find this assertion difficult to accept. For, even his very own witnesses belied his alibi. ACSP Gaña, Jr. testified and confirmed that Justice Demetria only said "hi."33 SSP Dañosos, denied seeing him and claimed that it was only Atty. Paas who peeped into his room.34 Suspiciously, it was really in the office of SP Formaran III, whom respondent Justice Demetria did not know, where Justice Demetria, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok decided to "stay a while."35
Thus, as found by Mme. Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, the Investigating Justice, Justice Demetria and company could not have been there to exchange pleasantries with SPs Formaran III and Fonacier since they were not acquainted with each other. Prior to this incident, Justice Demetria did not personally know either SP Formaran III or SP Fonacier, a fact corroborated by respondent himself.36
All of these contradict and belie respondent Justice Demetria's earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that "[b]ecause Prosecutor Formaran is also a friend, we decided to drop by his office . . . (and) I stayed a while."37
As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, respondent Justice was there "to join forces with Go Teng Kok in arguing for the withdrawal of Formaran's Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro, which was the real purpose of their visit to SP Formaran and to the DOJ. The uncanny coincidence in the timing of Justice Demetria's visit to SP Formaran's office, and that of Go Teng Kok, could not have been 'accidental' but pre-arranged."38 And, "visiting old friends" only came as an afterthought. The circumstances simply show that Justice Demetria and Atty. Paas, together with Go Teng Kok, did not go to the DOJ to see Sec. Tuquero, but to visit, if not "pressure," CSP Zuño and SP Formaran III.
Justice Demetria also claimed that it is inconceivable for him to help Yu Yuk Lai and Go Teng Kok, both of whom he did not personally know, and more unthinkable that he would be asking help from SP Formaran III whom he had just met for the first time.
The argument cannot be sustained. It is admitted that respondent is a very close friend of Atty. Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok. And, it is not necessary that respondent Justice Demetria be acquainted with Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai or SP Formaran III for him to intercede in behalf of the accused. It is enough that he is a close friend of the lawyer of Go Teng Kok, who has been helping the accused, and that he wields influence as a former DOJ Undersecretary and later, Acting Secretary, and now, a Justice of the Court of Appeals.
In sum, we find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses convincing and trustworthy, as compared to those of the defense which do not only defy natural human experience but are also riddled with major inconsistencies which create well-founded and overriding doubts.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy of responsibility. His at all times must be characterized with propriety and must be above suspicion.39 His must be free of even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties, but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private individual.
Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed failed to live up to this expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not only make a mockery of his high office, but also caused incalculable damage to the entire Judiciary. The mere mention of his name in the national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen and interfering with her prosecution seriously undermined the integrity of the entire Judiciary.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness tha a seat in the Judiciary.40 High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society cannot be preserved.41 There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.42
WHEREFORE, we sustain the findings of the Investigating Justice and hold Justice Demetrio G. Demetria GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to any government office, agency or instrumentality, including any government owned or controlled corporation or institution.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.
Puno, J ., abroad on official leave.
Footnotes
1 Rule 2.04, Code of Judicial Conduct.
2 21 July 2000 issue of The Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. 20.
3 Exh. "A".
4 Exhs. "B" and "C."
5 Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, presiding.
6 Information dated 9 December 1998, filed by State Prosecutor Pablo C. Formaran III.
7 Exh. "F."
8 Exh. "G."
9 Exh. "H."
10 Exh. "I."
11 Exh. "K."
12 Exh. "O."
13 Exh. "N."
14 Exh. "P."
15 Exh. "S."
16 Exh. "T."
17 Exh. "U."
18 TSN, 24 August 2000, p. 35.
19 Id., p. 34.
20 Compliance of SP Pablo C. Formaran III, dated 1 August 2000.
21 TSN, 24 August 2000, pp. 25-26.
22 Id., pp. 26-27.
23 TSN, 24 August 2000, pp. 73-74.
24 Ibid.
25 Compliance of CSP Jovencito R. Zuño, dated 2 August 2000.
26 TSN, 24 August 2000, p. 53; Exh. "V."
27 Id., p. 54.
28 5 January 2001 Report of Mme. Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, p. 12.
29 Committee Report No. 396 of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights submitted on 29 August 2000.
30 See Note 28, p. 11.
31 TSN, 24 August 2000, p. 74.
32 Counter Affidavit of respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria, pars. 1 and 2.
33 TSN, 8 September 2000, p. 8.
34 Id., p. 18.
35 Exh. "5," p. 1.
36 Memorandum of the Respondent, p. 20; TSN, 13 November 2000, p. 82.
37 Compliance of Justice Demetria, dated 24 July 2000, p. 1.
38 See Note 30.
39 Jereos, Jr. v. Reblando, Sr., AM No. 141, 31 May 1976, 71 SCRA 126.
40 Dia-Añonuevo v. Bercacio, AM No. 177-MJ, 27 November 1975, 68 SCRA 81.
41 Candia v. Tagabucba, AM No. 528, MJ, 12 September 1977, 79 SCRA 51.
42 Barja Jr., v. Judge Bercacio, AM No. 561-MJ, 29 December 1976, 74 SCRA 355.
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